An analytical view on the Ideal vs. the Practical approach to the Commonwealth

“For Plato, the prince of philosophers, who has no superior as a writer, chose his own ground that he might construct a commonwealth according to his fancy. His was a noble state, no doubt, but incongruous with human life and customs.” (Cicero, On the Commonwealth) This is a quote given by Laelius when discussing with Scipio the nature of a commonwealth, and how to create an ideal governmental system. It will be the jumping off point for the construction of my thesis and topic regarding the opposing viewpoints of idealism and pragmatism. The purpose of this examination is to demonstrate that a commonwealth is not capable of functioning harmoniously as an idyllic, and in order to best fulfill the goal of a commonwealth, a pragmatic approach must be utilized. 

An idealistic approach to governance has been pondered for millennia. Plato exhibited this very fact in his Republic. Cicero accuses Plato of “arbitrarily creating an imaginary state”, while Plato is only concerned with how best to preserve truth and virtue in his state. Plato provides a formidable construction of a society, and his approach has been emulated by many philosophers and political theorists since. I will not be following his argumentation, and instead posit that not only is his idealistic society an improper mode of the commonwealth, it is also not possible to be conceived by virtue of Wittgenstein’s analytic theory. This means that not only should a commonwealth be governed pragmatically, it is unable to be understood any other way.

In order to understand how this is to come to pass, a definition and final goal should be outlined.  I will continue to use Cicero’s definition of a commonwealth, which includes a telos in it. Scipio says in Cicero’s dialogue: “The commonwealth, then, is the people’s affair; is the coming together of a considerable number of men who are united by a common agreement about law and rights and by the desire to participate in mutual advantages.” (Cicero, On the Commonwealth) Plato is concerned with how men live by placing them under authority, while Cicero is concerned with how men live when they come together. The end goal for both of these two authors is the happiness of the tenants. The commonwealth is more than just a state, it is the fellowship man has with other men. It is a relational structure built upon the very essence of human nature. An idealistic approach to this structure assumes that justice and virtue will always prevail within man under the right conditions. A pragmatic method deals with things as they are in a practical manner, demonstrating humility and reserving judgment. This is especially pertinent when discussing the condition of man, as the ideal is completely unequipped to deal with the depths of his depravity. Therefore, in order for a commonwealth to function properly, it must take into account all aspects of human nature in order to bring happiness to each respective component. 

“No cry of torment can be greater than the cry of one man. Or again, no torment can be greater than what a single human being may suffer. A man is capable of infinite torment therefore, and so too he can stand in need of infinite help.” (Wittgenstein, L, Culture and Value) Recognizing this reality is the first step to governing a society pragmatically. The human condition lies outside reason, and therefore cannot be rationalized. My thesis can then be expanded:  A pragmatic approach which is able to take into consideration human nature is better suited to government than Plato’s idealism, because it begins with a proper starting point and acknowledges that help is outside man. A truly idealistic philosophy is not possible, whereas a pragmatic recognizes its own limits and is closer to the true good, being Christianity, and necessarily closer to true happiness, the end goal of the commonwealth.

For Plato, spirituality walks hand in hand with philosophy. He employs a system in which philosophers are raised from a young age to know best how to properly cultivate a state so that it may best live in accordance with virtue. “Inasmuch as philosophers only are able to grasp the eternal and unchangeable, and those who wander in the region of the many and variable are not philosophers.” (Plato, Republic, Book 6) In addition, Plato holds an extremely generous view of man in his discourse, believing that the citizens will be able to see the truth and live accordingly. “‘And if the world perceives that what we are saying about him is the truth, will they be angry with philosophy? Will they disbelieve us, when we tell them that no State can be happy which is not designed by artists who imitate the heavenly pattern?’ ‘They will not be angry if they understand.’” (Plato, Republic, Book 6) In the not yet applied concepts of Plato’s Republic, the weight of the burden is on the rulers to act as appropriate conductors of truth and virtue, passing just laws so that they may best emulate these morals in themselves, and that by seeing and following under their guidance, the citizens will morph into rational and willing modal creatures to preserve the integrity of this society. “Let there be one man who has a city obedient to his will, and he might bring into existence the ideal polity about which the world is so incredulous…The ruler may impose the laws and institutions which we have been describing, and the citizens may possibly be willing to obey them? Certainly.” (Plato, Republic, Book 6) Here it is apparent to see the unrealistic view Plato has on the nature of man. At this point in his treatise, he assumes only the best, and presumes no fault in his argumentation.

In an ideal world, Plato theoretically devised a system that is capable of preserving truth, justice and virtue for all who partake in it. This is a noble task, starting from universal goods and applying them to the particulars below. If just one man was capable of the deeds and characteristics that Plato describes, he would prove to be a leader worthy to lead his citizens in a righteous manner. There is one major flaw which Plato attempts to address, but provides an insufficient explanation. This key flaw is a tyrant, for Plato acknowledges the dangers presented by such a figure. “And when his other lusts, amid clouds of incense and perfumes and garlands and wines, and all the pleasures of a dissolute life, now let loose, come buzzing around him, nourishing to the utmost the sting of desire which they implant in his drone-like nature, then at last this lord of the soul, having madness for the captain of his guard, breaks out into a frenzy; and if he finds in himself any good opinions or appetites in process of formation, and there is in him any sense of shame remaining, to these better principles he puts an end, and casts them forth until he has purged away temperance and brought in madness to the full. Yes, that is the way in which the tyrannical man is generated.” (Plato, Republic, Book 9) Plato acknowledges the possibility of a tyrant, which is one in power who forsakes his duty to preserve justice, instead taking a right that is not his in order to serve only himself and neglect the good of those beneath him. Plato’s reckless idealism is very clear when addressing the problem of a tyrant, as his first steps are to reorder the division of the human soul, and demonstrate how a tyrant is actually most unhappy. “Is there any man in whom you will find more of this sort of misery than in the tyrannical man, who is in a fury of passions and desires? Impossible.” (Plato, Republic, Book 9) Plato concludes by presuming that in the perfect case, the issue would take care of itself: “He will look at the city which is within him, and take heed that no disorder occur in it such as might arise either from superfluity or from want; and upon this principle he will regulate his property and gain or spend according to his means.” (Plato, Republic, Book 9) He then remarks yet again that this situation may never even occur. 

Here again Plato remains caught in his own idealism. He does not dwell long on logistical problems because the nature of the ideal necessarily discredits them. The problem of a tyrant only arises if one has presupposed a negative connotation to man based on skepticism. A prudent actor would do this, but Plato has no need for this methodology, as it is not contained within the principles of idealism. If an idealistic society was not idealistic, it would not serve its function, thus one must necessarily look at tyranny from Plato’s lens. From this perspective, there is no reason to believe that under the proper guidance a tyranny would be absolutely stomped out. This creates a logical tautology, where the concept is sound because of its own essence. This is the primary objection to pragmatism, and those who follow this line of thinking present a valid point as long as their view is contained within itself. 

It is for this reason that I assert that idealism cannot truly be known due to Wittgenstein’s analytic approach to logic. Plato does not initially construct his city as an ideal, but his beginning of the account of the ideal. This beginning account is the substance, being that thing which stands underneath, of the state of affairs, which is his ideal state. Before proceeding, Wittgenstein’s terminology must be established in order to garner a proper understanding from his language. (Wittgenstein, L, Tractatus) Wittgenstein calls facts a combination of objects (2.01). What is the case, i.e., being, is a fact, or a state of affairs (2). Objects are circumstances, entities, or things that stand in relation to one another to create a state of affairs (2.01-2.011). In order to know an object, one must know all its internal qualities (2.012321). Substance exists independently of what is the case, and determines the truth value of the state of affairs (2.024). The world is everything that is the case (1). Thus, the hierarchy goes: world, state of affairs/facts, objects, properties, with substance independently comprising the truth value. Applied to Plato’s model of a commonwealth, the ideal society is the state of affairs under the world, with the people being objects that compose the fact through their relations. In order for this fact to be known, however, the objects must be known, and in order for the objects to be known, their properties must be known. Wittgenstein’s previous quote described man as something capable of infinite torment. This capacity for the infinite leads to an infinite number of properties, consequently rendering an understanding of the man, the object, impossible. If it is impossible to know the object, then it is impossible to know the state of affairs composed by the objects. With the ideal society being Plato’s state of affairs containing these objects capable of the infinite, it follows that one cannot truly know the fact, the idyllic. 

If one cannot know the idyllic, then the commonwealth cannot be established according to its methodology. A suitable commonwealth, then, must be one where the constituents are aware of the human condition. They must be aware that an idealistic worldview will not, and cannot function properly with its own parts holding it back. This is the essence of prudence, which when found in the members of the commonwealth provides results that are more to the good, and fulfills the telos of the commonwealth. Nobody better exemplifies this rationale than Augustine, who wrestles with his own passions, desires, and evils. In one quote, he demonstrates not only the utility of the skeptical method, but also how this pragmatic approach more properly reaches this end point of a commonwealth by infusing a realistic understanding of man with the need for a savior, which leads to the straightest path to happiness. “Such things as these I turned over in my wretched heart, burdened with corroding cares from the fear of dying without having discovered the truth. Yet the faith of your Christ, our Lord and Savior (2 Pt 2:20), professed in the Catholic Church, was strongly fixed in my heart. In many ways indeed I was as yet unformed, and I did not always adhere to the rule of sound doctrine yet my mind did not forsake it, but rather more and more imbibed it with each passing day.” (Augustine, Confessions, Book 7.6)